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This article contributes to the discourse on hybridity by reviewing the development 
of the legal framework related to traditional governance mechanisms in Timor-Leste 
in the twenty years since independence in 2002. It analyzes how this framework 
has contributed to nurturing governance in the country and argues that traditional 
governance mechanisms have had a considerable role in improving governance 
since independence. It is also argued that with regulation and proper support from 
stakeholders, a traditional governance system can facilitate democratization, and that 
the host community can become the driver of positive change.
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Introduction
This article reviews the development of the legal framework related to traditional 
governance mechanisms in Timor-Leste during the two decades since the 
restoration of independence in 2002. It then analyzes how these traditional 
governance mechanisms have developed over this period and how their 
formalization is being considered. It will also discuss how the political leaders and 
the Timorese people perceive traditional governance mechanisms and customary 
laws. 
In the discourse on hybridity, both Hunt (2018) and Boege (2018) argue 
that “the concept of hybridization tries to capture the fluid, dynamic, emergent 
and relational quality of the reality it is meant to grasp” (Hunt 2018, 52). In 
the context of hybrid peacebuilding, Uesugi (2020, 2) notes that hybridity is 
“continuous interaction of different actors—both locals and internationals,” while 
emphasizing that it is not just a marriage between Western norms and traditional 
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values. Jackson and Albrecht (2018) reinforce the arguments of Hunt and Boege 
on the notion of hybridity, underlining that it is a “starting point to comprehend” 
coexistence, interaction, and overlap of structures, rules and logics. It is becoming 
obvious that the recent discourse goes beyond perceiving hybridity as merely 
the coexistence of local and international norms, but instead builds on that 
argument, in that it clearly invites analysis of a process that accommodates the 
co-functioning of social systems, as well as interaction among the intersectoral 
actors and elements that are involved in that process.   
Through an ongoing analysis of the traditional governance mechanisms 
in Timor-Leste, this article contributes to the discourse on hybridization of 
governance by providing an example of the blending of traditional rules and 
liberal peace.
Definitions 
Here, we primarily apply C. K. Allen’s definition of customary law: “Native 
customary law means a rule or a body of rules regulating rights and imposing 
correlative duties, being a rule or a body of rules which obtains and is fortified by 
established native usage and which is appropriate and applicable to any particular 
cause, action, suit, matter, dispute, and includes also any native customary law” 
(Allen 1939). We also refer to the definition of customary law employed by 
Tetsumi Kato in his 1992 article, “Theory of Customs.” Kato (1992, 11) defines 
customary law thus: “The social norms, apart from the basic laws and state laws 
implemented by a state or a statutory authority, that the various members and 
the groups of people of a society are accustomed to, and comply with as rules, are 
collectively called customary law.”
There are many definitions of community, but in this article, it is defined as 
a geographical distribution of individuals (in this case in Timor-Leste) who have 
close ties to a geographical area in terms of natural resource management. This 
is a slight adaptation of Ernest W. Burgess’s definition of community as “social 
groups where they are considered from the point of view of the geographical 
distribution of the individuals and institutions of which they are composed” 
(Burgess 1967, 144). Community in Timor-Leste is therefore the geographical 
distribution of people at the village (suco in Tetum) and hamlet (aldeia in Tetum) 
levels.
Background
After its establishment in October 1999, the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) operated in collaboration with the 
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then ruling party, the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente 
(FRETILIN). Many of FRETILIN’S political leaders were in exile in other 
Portuguese-speaking countries during the Indonesian occupation, where they 
were influenced by the style of contemporary Portuguese left-wing politics. This 
inevitably brought influences from Portuguese-speaking countries to bear on 
Timor-Leste in addition to what was visibly imported by UNTAET. 
The same can be said about the enactment of laws. For the practical reason 
of avoiding the risk of disruption to daily life, UNTAET retained laws that were 
in force during Indonesian rule, such as the Road Traffic Law, as long as they 
were not in conflict with the Basic Law introduced by UNTAET. In particular, 
UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, which more or less functioned as the temporary 
foundation for the laws in Timor-Leste, was strongly influenced by the West, and 
the series of laws introduced thereafter were influenced by Portuguese philosophy 
of law through its legal advisers and registration drafters who had been trained in 
Portugal and other European countries. Such influences were accepted without 
much deliberation, particularly because of the political sensitivity surrounding 
any mention of Indonesian influence at that time.
Western influence through UNTAET on the one hand, and Portuguese 
influence through the Timorese political leaders on the other, contributed to the 
formation of a “modernized” style of governance and rule of law in the country. 
Building on that foundation, the president and the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste promulgated a constitution when the country became 
an internationally recognized independent state in May 2002. During the years of 
instability and recovery from the continued violence, the political leaders called 
upon their constituencies to reflect their customs and traditions in the formation 
of a Timorese identity that emphasized the difference between Timor-Leste and 
other former Portuguese colonies. During an August 2013 interview concerning 
perceptions of customary laws in Timor-Leste, Senior Minister Agio Pereira told 
the authors, 
Our traditions and culture…became the sense of identity that triggered the power to 
resist the Indonesian occupation. Not the Marxist ideologies or communist/socialist 
ideologies like in Angola or Mozambique, where they had this ideological angle to 
justify the anti-colonial/anti-imperial struggle.
Senior Minister Pereira’s words indicate that culture and tradition, rather 
than ideology, formed the backbone of Timorese identity. Timor-Leste’s nation-
hood may have been socially crafted, but the senior minister almost suggests that 
it does not pass the test of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” theory 
(Anderson 1983). Is Timorese nationalism a creation that drove the movement 
that led to independence in 2002, or is it a legacy of the pre-colonial, pre-
national era, in the communities that existed in the small-scale kingdoms that 
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were led by Liurai (local kings in Tetum)? In order to answer that question, we 
should consider how customary norms and traditional governance have been 
acknowledged in the constitution.  
The legislation drafted by the new government of Timor-Leste and the laws 
suggested by international legal advisers did not visibly refer to the country’s 
customary norms or traditional governance mechanisms that were dormant 
at that time. Under Indonesian rule, activities based on Timorese culture and 
traditions were restricted or suppressed, because they were often suspected of 
having links with the anti-government movement. In many areas, particularly 
in the rural towns, memories of this suppression continued to influence 
the Timorese people long after the arrival of UNTAET and independence, 
undermining traditional practices, particularly their associated governance 
mechanisms. That being said, a small number of traditional practices appear 
to have slowly revived under the transitional administration, one of the earlier 
instances of which was an inauguration ceremony for Tara Bandu held in a 
mountain village in Liquica Municipality in February 2001. 
Traditional practices were not given the attention they deserved until the 
formation of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East 
Timor (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste, 
CAVR). CAVR employed Nahe Biti—a traditional judicial process that is one of 
the main mechanisms of governance in Timor-Leste—in its community recon-
ciliation process. Enquiries into the violence and human rights violations and 
community reconciliation were sought through Nahe Biti Boot, or “big Nahe 
Biti,” hearings that took place in almost every village in the country between 2002 
and 2005. Existing studies on Nahe Biti Boot predominantly highlight positive 
views of the process’s deliberations and conclusions, although some (pivotal) 
negative views have been expressed. This study underlines the significance of 
CAVR’s use of the process at a time when traditional governance mechanisms 
were not mainstreamed by international advisers and aid workers. In CAVR-
hosted reconciliation, needless to say, the parties who made most effective use of 
the traditional governance mechanisms were the Timorese and their traditional 
leaders.
Definition of these traditional institutions of governance is ongoing and 
requires further deliberation. Many examples of so-called traditional governance 
may be found in Southeast Asia well as in Africa and the Americas. Adat 
in Indonesia and Malaysia is one tradition that is linked with governance 
mechanisms. In the neighboring Indonesian island of Bali, there is awig-awig, 
a traditional regulatory framework which is often administered by the desa 
adat (customary village in Bahasa Indonesia) or banjar (hamlet in Balinese). 
Some argue that traditional governance systems are “led by local indigenous 
knowledge in collaborative and participatory processes” (Gakhal 2020), but they 
are not always collaborative and participatory, as we can see from this study 
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on Timor-Leste. Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey (2016, 3) look at traditional 
governance entailing “selection of chiefs and elders, or procedures for decision-
making, dispute settlement, land allocation, or inheritance.” They point out 
that “contemporary and traditional forms of governance coexist with the 
political institutions and laws of states” (Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey 2016, 3). 
However, they do not define traditional governance and conclude by saying, “an 
institutionalist research agenda addressing the need for theory and systematic 
data collection and explanatory approaches” will help efforts to define it as it is 
still a work in progress (Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey 2016, 2). Similarly, this 
study does not intend to define the traditional governance mechanisms as they 
exist in Timor-Leste but instead will consider lisan—which translates as “customs” 
in the local language, Tetum—as the foundation of traditional governance.
Such traditional governance mechanisms were implemented and enforced 
by “kingdoms,” led by the local kings (Liurai), that existed before and during 
the Portuguese colonial period and were reactivated by the communities with 
assistance from Timorese civil society organizations, such as the Haburas 
Foundation, during the UNTAET period. Lisan institutions now coexist 
with the Timorese government and their regularization in state laws is under 
consideration, as they can be used to help realize the rule of law. 
Lisan, the substantive set of customs for traditional governance in Timor-
Leste, has transformed its functions according to certain standards, such as the 
notion of democracy that the communities accepted in response to the reality 
that they faced in the post-conflict period. One well-known example of the 
application of traditional law in Timor-Leste’s peacebuilding process is the civil 
reconciliation process led by CAVR. Since then, the traditional governance 
mechanisms in Timor-Leste, which were seen as part of its feudal heritage, 
began to be transformed into more liberal institutions with the support of 
international organizations and bilateral agencies (Miyazawa and Miyazawa 
2020). This transformation was carried out by the Timorese government out of 
a desire to regularize customary laws. From another angle, efforts to regularize 
the traditional governance mechanisms made those mechanisms more consistent 
with the relevant laws of Timor-Leste. While this study recognizes the efforts 
made by the Timorese Ministry of Justice in defining and regularizing customary 
laws, it is argued here that lisan, or traditional governance mechanisms, are being 
reinstituted in Timorese communities through regularization.  
The Nature and History of the Conflict 
Timor-Leste was colonized by Portugal in the seventeenth century. In 1975, after 
decolonization a year earlier, the pro-independence party, FRETILIN, declared 
the independence of Timor-Leste. The Indonesian government of the time was 
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interested in Timor-Leste’s natural resources, especially the oil and gas reserves 
in the Timor Sea. This interest converged with the pro-annexation position held 
by mainstream military officials and presidential advisers, so Indonesia took 
advantage of decolonization to invade the territory. To gauge Western reaction 
to its move, Indonesia took a step-by-step approach to the invasion. The initial 
deployment of troops to Timor-Leste was met by silence from the Western 
countries, so Indonesia carried out a full-scale invasion. In the midst of the Cold 
War, the Western countries, particularly the United States, had an interest in 
maintaining safe passage through Indonesian waters and in preventing the left-
wing insurgents from holding power in Timor-Leste. Against that background, 
Indonesian forces invaded Timor-Leste in December 1975 and occupied it until 
1999. 
During the Indonesian occupation, resistance continued in the form of 
guerrilla warfare, waged mostly in the countryside (Candio and Bleiker 2001). 
Pro-Indonesian militias and the security forces committed large-scale human 
rights violations, including murders, rapes, torture, and forced relocation on a 
massive scale. Repression by the authorities is asserted to have resulted in the 
deaths of about two hundred thousand Timorese, or approximately one-quarter 
of the population (Chomsky, Shalom, and Albert 1999). 
In the August 1999 popular consultation, about 79 percent of Timorese 
voters opted for independence from Indonesia. But immediately after the 
announcement of the ballot result, the security forces and pro-Indonesian militia 
groups went on a nationwide rampage in Timor-Leste, destroying an estimated 70 
percent of the territory’s infrastructure (Tee 2000). The death toll was estimated at 
six hundred people, although the UN conceded that the number could have been 
much higher (Candio and Bleiker 2001). Timor-Leste regained its status as an 
independent country in May 2002.
Under Portuguese rule, the underdeveloped infrastructure and geographical 
conditions hampered traffic between urban areas and villages, and under 
Indonesian rule, the authorities restricted the movement of people. As a result, 
each village community became solidified, and the custom of treating a “com-
munity” as one social unit was enforced. Furthermore, familial ties established by 
marital relationships developed within geographically limited areas, thus creating 
a network of relatives within a community. These circumstances facilitated 
the strengthening of the community model headed by a lia nain (traditional 
clan leader, or “keeper of the words” in Tetum) with a patrilineal (matrilineal) 
extended family sharing an uma lulik (sacred house for a clan/clans). Such a 
community structure centered on a sacred house that hosts the spirits of the clan’s 
ancestors is an indication that Timorese society has its foundation in animism. 
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Overview of the Community in Timor-Leste and Traditional 
Governance
With the above definitions of customary law offered by Allen (1939) and Kato 
(1992) in mind, it is appropriate to define Timor-Leste’s lisan as a set of customary 
laws that comprise the traditional governance mechanism. Although there is 
some variety in interpretation, since Timorese culture and traditions have been 
transmitted orally, three main types of lisan instruments have been identified: 
Nahe Biti, a traditional judicial process involving village arbitration and 
mediation functions; Tara Bandu, a set of rules or norms in the village; and Feto 
San Uma Mane which defines and regulates the mutual aid relationship among 
the relatives of married couples. This article will focus on Nahe Biti.
The overall characteristics of traditional governance mechanisms are similar 
in all thirteen municipalities. For example, the traditional justice system, Nahe 
Biti or its equivalent, uses the same procedures for both criminal and civil cases. 
Another feature is that it has strong restorative justice functions as it focuses on 
maintaining relationships between people and communities. Another unique 
characteristic of lisan in general is that the boundary between the private (such as 
private ownership) and the public (such as community ownership) is blurred.  
Keeping those points in mind, this article will examine the general structures 
of the traditional governance mechanisms in Timor-Leste, particularly Nahe Biti.
Implementing Organization
Which body presides over a particular case depends on which of the three 
main instruments shown in Figure 1 is implemented (there are some regional 
differences). The Tara Bandu process is mainly led by a Chefe de Suco, the village 











Tara Bandu (traditional rules/
norms applied for environmental 
management)
Nahe Biti (traditional justice)
Feto San Uma Mane (mutual aid 
relationship among the relatives 
of married couples)
Figure 1. Three Main Instruments of Lisan, the Timorese Traditional Governance Mechanism
Source: Satoru Miyazawa and Naori Miyazawa (2018).
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on the scale of the case or the incident. The role of implementer may also be 
assumed by the local government or the church.  
For example, the Draft Act on the Traditional Judiciary (of December 2020) 
specifies the village chief as the implementer of Nahe Biti. However, in practice, 
this position is usually taken by the lia nain. For example, a village official in Aileu 
Municipality, who regularly facilitates the Nahe Biti procedures, emphasized 
that it is the lia nain who takes the leading role, while the village chief merely 
witnesses the procedure and acknowledges its rightness (Interviews with villagers 
in Aileu, July 2013). This point was confirmed by a senior official of the Ministry 
of Justice who is leading the drafting of the Traditional Justice Act (Interview with 
Vital Nelinho, December 30, 2016).
Of the above-mentioned five main types of cases/issues adjudicated through 
the Nahe Biti process, cases regarding land and property ownership disputes that 
involve more than one village or hamlet are handled by the village chiefs and/
or the sub-district administrator (see Figure 2). Responsibility for implementing 
Feto San Uma Mane is often assumed by the lia nain or an adult male such as a 
father or uncle.
While Nahe Biti is regularly conducted by local chiefs at village/hamlet level, 
the process may also be carried out by the district/sub-district administrator 
(president of the municipality) or by the church when it is a matter of concern to 
the wider community. When Nahe Biti decisions made at village/hamlet level are 
seriously contested, the process at district/church level can function as an appeal 
process, although this hierarchical relationship is neither formal nor written 
down. Regardless of the implementing body, Nahe Biti procedures carried out at 
Figure 2. Conceptual Relationships between Administrative and Customary Leadership




Ritual leader (e.g., lia nain)
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the district/church level are often called Nahe Biti Boot, or big Nahe Biti, and they 
involve the wider community. As the name implies, this is a large-scale traditional 
justice procedure. Nahe Biti Boot was the community reconciliation process 
typically implemented by CAVR. In this context, traditional governance acts as a 
veneer for the formal government administration or the church. However, it also 
takes more of a hybrid form.   
Nahe Biti may also be implemented jointly by the local chiefs and the 
district/church, depending on the magnitude and the scope of the matter under 
consideration. In June 2016, a Nahe Biti was held in Ermera District on the 
occasion of the opening of a new church. Some members of the community or 
their relatives had not been repatriated from Indonesian-controlled West Timor 
because of their past affiliation with the pro-autonomy forces, and the purpose of 
the Nahe Biti was to promote reconciliation among the community members and 
facilitate the repatriation (Interview with Mario Nunes, official of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Timor-Leste, December 28, 2016). This 
Nahe Biti process is not only credited with amicably resolving the dispute and 
arranging the return and reintegration of the community members, but is also 
indicative of a hybrid conflict resolution approach involving both the traditional 
community and the church. 
Traditional Justice: Nahe Biti
 
In this section, the overall mechanism of Nahe Biti is explained. The explanation 
is based on data that has been continuously collected since 2001 by the 
authors, information obtained from interviews conducted at a village in Aileu 
Municipality in July 2013, and interviews in Dili City, Dili Municipality, in 
December 2016. From the interviews, it was found that the procedural flow of 
Nahe Biti is similar in all thirteen municipalities of Timor-Leste, but the details of 
the procedure may differ depending on the region. 
As shown in Figure 2, Nahe Biti is generally used to adjudicate five main 
types of matters: land and property ownership disputes, violence and incidents 
causing damage (e.g., arson, theft, violence, domestic violence, etc.), marriage and 
divorce, inheritance, and other disputes related to the village such as violation of 
Tara Bandu or village regulations.
Nahe Biti translates as “spreading (nahe) the carpet (biti).” The term derives 
from the practice of conducting the dispute settlement procedure on a large 
carpet. The principal administrator of Nahe Biti is the lia nain, leader of an 
extended patrilineal family consisting of members of an uma lulik. The Nahe Biti 
process is used to adjudicate matters internal to a clan or matters or incidents 
involving two or more clans within a community such as a village (suco) or hamlet 
(aldeia). In some cases, it is a procedure for confirming the facts of a conflict 
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and then mediating between the parties concerned and repairing the relationship. 
One party, usually the victim (or the perpetrator in some cases), makes a 
complaint to, for example, the lia nain or the Council of Elders (Katuas/Catuas). 
The lia nain or the Chefe de Suco hears the case and adjudicates on it. The 
Council of Elders invites all the persons involved in the case and their patriarchs 
(or relatives who play the role of patriarchs) to the hearing. The Council of 
Elders is a committee consisting of elders from the village or the clan who are 
knowledgeable in village matters. The size and composition of the Council differ 
from one village/clan to another.
In most cases, the participation of all villagers or all patriarchs is required, 
except when the hearing requires privacy. However, there are some differences 
in the composition of the participants depending on the case and the region. In 
cases where a certain level of privacy is required, only those involved in the case 
may be invited. Generally speaking, there are no absentees, but if an individual 
or a party does not comply with the convocation, it is believed that they will be 
cursed by the spirits of their ancestors and they will be isolated from their family 
and socially excluded from the community. The threat of a “curse” and social 
exclusion enables the adjudicators to enforce the procedure and the subsequent 
decisions.  
Implementation Procedure of Nahe Biti  
The Nahe Biti procedures are conducted in a sacred house in front of the spirits 
of the ancestors. This is because many Timorese set great store by the blessing of 
these spirits along with the spirits of nature and the earth. The legitimacy of the 
procedure is enhanced by the interpretation that the mediation is “protected” 
by the ancestors. By hearing testimony and carrying out evidence confirmation, 
fact finding, and agreement in front of the souls of the clan’s ancestors in the uma 
lulik, the parties in conflict are motivated to tell the truth and accept mediation. 
This also strengthens the binding force of the decision or agreement.
Nahe Biti and Timorese Culture
Nahe Biti appears to be trusted by Timorese communities. Under Indonesian rule, 
the people distrusted the formal judicial process, not only because they resisted 
the Indonesian authorities, but also because only a small number of people had 
access to justice for various reasons, including socioeconomic ones. Despite 
pressure from the Indonesian authorities and regulations against the practice 
of traditions and customs, Nahe Biti, along with other traditional governance 
mechanisms, continued to be implemented under the occupation, particularly in 
rural areas. There are several reasons why people trust the traditional governance 
mechanisms. 
Culturally, Timorese people are resistant to formalization. Timorese com-
munities were formed under the leadership of a traditional leader or clan leader, 
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who is usually the eldest son of the clan. With Timor-Leste being a relatively 
small, mountainous island, the community unit could only grow to a certain 
extent, mostly due to geographical limitations. In addition, natural disasters 
such as landslides and floods, triggered by the country’s harsh climate, require 
community members to support one another in order to safeguard their 
livelihoods and to rely on justice administered by the lia nain in the uma lulik. 
Finally, community members are not accustomed to depending on outsiders 
in judicial matters and are reluctant to deal with household affairs in a formal 
judicial setting. 
Even if the community decides to resort to the formal courts, access is limited 
for both systemic and socioeconomic reasons. The country’s mountainous terrain 
and underdeveloped transportation infrastructure make it difficult for most 
inhabitants to reach the capital city of Dili. This is where the national courts and 
many legal service providers are located, with only a few district courts located 
outside the capital. Under such circumstances, people face difficulties in accessing 
formal justice options. 
For the purpose of assessing the international community’s support for 
various judicial reforms, the United Nations compiled the “Report of the 
Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment of the Justice Sector” in 2009. 
The report highlighted “limited access to courts” as the core challenge associated 
with access to justice. Regarding the number of judges and the limited capacity of 
legal services (i.e., private lawyers), it emphasized the need to upgrade the Legal 
Training and Research Institute and increase the number of courts, as there were 
only four courts serving the whole nation. Along with other solutions, a proposal 
to establish a circuit court was mentioned, but considering the limited resources, 
it may not be a realistic solution for the time being (United Nations Mission in 
Timor-Leste 2009). 
Regularization of the Traditional Governance Mechanisms 
The government of Timor-Leste recognized the relevance of Timorese traditions, 
inevitably including the traditional governance mechanisms, in the process 
leading to independence, and it has emphasized their significance in various rules 
and regulations. The government began by highlighting the value of customs 
and traditions in Timor-Leste’s constitution of 2002. Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the 
constitution reads: “The State shall recognize and value the norms and customs 
of Timor-Leste that are not contrary to the constitution and to any legislation 
dealing specifically with customary law.” 
The relationship between customary law and the constitution is codified 
as mentioned above. One question that remains, however, is how traditional 
governance mechanisms are regularized by legislation. Among other laws of 
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Timor-Leste, the most relevant is the Lei Sobre Justiça Tradicional (the Draft Act 
on Traditional Justice). 
The Draft Act on Traditional Justice
As of December 2020, the Draft Act on Traditional Justice (hereinafter, the Draft 
Act) was still under discussion by the cabinet. It envisages a traditional justice 
system that will have legal effect, although it does not explicitly define customary 
law or traditional justice. The purpose of the Draft Act has been defined as 
follows: “The Act envisages, by approving the customary norms and practices in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the constitution, the 
nation will be enabled to establish a functional link between the mechanisms 
of the traditional judiciary and the formal judiciary represented by the courts” 
(Interview with Vital Nelinho, December 30, 2016). The Draft Act describes the 
traditional judiciary that is widely used by the people and the legal effect that the 
decisions of this traditional system should be granted. It also clarifies how appeals 
should be made to the formal courts if decisions of the traditional system are not 
respected.
In confidence, a Ministry of Justice official suggested to the authors that 
the drafting of this particular act is an initiative led by the Ministry of Justice 
and that it is perceived as a rather technical act. Therefore, the official expected 
that it would be difficult to obtain the necessary cabinet decision for the act to 
be submitted to parliament as there was a lack of political will among certain 
leaders. Understandably, the Ministry of Justice considers it imperative that the 
law should define traditional governance mechanisms if such mechanisms are to 
function as a regulatory instrument in the country. 
Regardless of how well such mechanisms are understood, whether they 
are adopted, and how they are applied by the communities, the regularization 
process must be solidified for it to be legitimate in terms of democracy. The 
question remains as to why this act has still not been finalized twenty years 
after independence given the widespread acceptance of traditional governance 
mechanisms in the communities.   
Responsibilities of the Village Chiefs
Article 10, Paragraph 1, Section (a) of the Law Concerning Community 
Leaderships and Their Election (LAW 3/2009, of July 8, 2009), approved by the 
parliament in 2009, stipulates that village chiefs are responsible for the promotion 
of peace and harmony in their villages (La’o Hamutuk 2009). The Draft Act on 
Traditional Justice cites the Nahe Biti traditional dispute resolution procedure, 
conducted by the village chief, as a means of fulfilling this responsibility. 
The Draft Act provides for the recording and reporting of dispute 
deliberations and decisions; it requires the village chief to record the decision/
agreement reached during the procedure (by the traditional method of dispute 
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resolution) in writing and to subsequently submit the record to the relevant 
authorities of the central government. This provision, therefore, puts in place a 
link between village chiefs, as the custodians of traditional justice, and the formal 
judiciary. In the past, as traditional governance mechanisms were part of the oral 
culture, the decisions/agreements obtained through traditional methods such 
as Nahe Biti were not commonly written down. The fact that many procedures 
still rely on oral decision/agreement, and that the literacy rate remains low at 68 
percent (World Bank 2018), may pose a challenge to the effective implementation 
of the Draft Act when it is approved. Another issue is that the Draft Act regards 
the village chief as the implementer of traditional justice. However, in reality, the 
village chief is not involved in all the proceedings undertaken by the traditional 
judiciary. 
As described above, the communities of Timor-Leste primarily consist of 
clan-based social units centered on the leadership of the lia nain and the Council 
of Elders, as well as the uma lulik to which the clan belongs. If the scale of a case/
issue is relatively large, such as when a dispute involves members of different 
villages or clans, the village or hamlet chief may also be the adjudicator or the 
arbitrator. However, in traditional judicial proceedings, especially in rural areas, 
it is the lia nain who manages the session. During the interview with Director 
Nelinho in 2016, it was explained that the Draft Act mentioned above stipulates 
the involvement of the village chief in Article 6, Paragraph 1 regarding traditional 
judicial proceedings, as follows:
In order to register the agreement obtained by the traditional judicial system, the head 
of suco (village) must be officially involved in the dispute resolution. The mission of 
the head of suco is to determine the method of dispute resolution and to assist the 
parties and the participants in the resolution procedure, but he does not enforce the 
decision. If the head of suco is not involved in the proceedings, in accordance with 
this provision, this Act will not acknowledge the decision/agreement obtained by the 
traditional judicial method. (Interview with Vital Nelinho, December 30, 2016)
In other words, it is understood that the Draft Act would not acknowledge 
many of the decisions/agreements reached by traditional dispute resolution 
proceedings because the village chiefs are not involved. In fact, as this study 
reveals, village chiefs are not often involved in the dispute resolution process. This 
puts into question the definition of traditional dispute resolution contained in 
this Draft Act.
According to the Ministry of Justice and the practitioners in villages, it is 
actually the lia nain who takes the initiative, and the village chief participates only 
to give legitimacy to the proceedings (Interview with Vital Nelinho, December 
30, 2016). In view of that, it is necessary to continue examining how traditional 
judicial proceedings are conducted in the villages.
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Registration of Agreement
Regarding the registration of the decision/agreement, Article 7 of the Draft Act 
stipulates that “agreements obtained by the traditional judiciary are recorded in 
writing by the head of the village,” and “the registration agreement is prepared 
by the head of the suco, including the statements from all parties concerned 
that proves their participation in the proceedings, and their agreement to the 
decision/agreement reached. Such a consent form needs to be attached to the 
record of the proceedings.” The registered agreement will be sent to the court or 
public prosecutor’s office. The responsibilities of the presiding judge or the public 
prosecutor’s office are stipulated in Article 9 (3), as explained by a senior official 
of the Ministry of Justice as follows:
The public prosecutor’s office or the presiding judge plays an important role in 
examining the conformity of the decision/agreement obtained by the traditional 
judicial proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Article 216, Paragraph 
3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the authority is responsible for 
confirming (1) whether the decision/agreement is included in the scope of the 
law as per Article 2 of the Act, and (2) whether or not there is a written consent of 
the parties that must be attached to the registration of the decision/agreement in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 7, Paragraph 2, and (3) to confirm whether 
the extent of the effect of the traditional judicial proceedings outlined in Article 11 is 
respected. (Interview with Vital Nelinho, December 30, 2016) 
The courts and the public prosecutor’s office have the authority to examine 
whether the agreement complies with the provisions of Article 11 of the Draft Act. 
Article 11 provides for the protection of basic human rights. It reads, “Decisions/ 
agreements obtained through traditional judicial proceedings must not include 
provisions that violate the basic human rights of the parties or sanction the 
freedom of the parties.”
Women’s Rights in Traditional Judicial Proceedings
From the liberal peace perspective, what vastly undermines many of Timor-
Leste’s traditional mechanisms is their ambiguity when it comes to women’s 
rights. In order to protect women’s rights, Article 6 of the Draft Act stipulates the 
following: “In a case where one or more parties are women, the head of the village 
can preferentially offer women participation in the proceedings.”
In some regions, women are not permitted to participate in traditional 
judicial proceedings. Violations of women’s rights of this kind have not gone 
unnoticed. According to a multi-year survey on law and justice conducted by the 
Asia Foundation, 25 percent of respondents to the 2004 survey were resistant to 
women speaking in traditional (lisan) proceedings. In a 2008 survey, 58 percent 
of respondents expressed resistance. In 2013, this rate dropped to 36 percent, 
although it was still higher than it had been in 2004 (Asia Foundation 2013). The 
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Ministry of Justice is aware of these data and is making efforts to overcome the 
challenge of women’s interests not being fully taken into consideration during 
traditional judicial proceedings.
The Law Concerning Community Leaderships and Their Election
This law, which came into effect in July 2009, details the authority of village and 
hamlet chiefs (L’ao Hamutuk 2009). Their roles in traditional judicial proceedings 
have been described above. In addition, the law provides for chiefs to advise the 
parties whether to formally lodge a case before the court (instead of relying on 
the traditional judiciary) in the event of a serious incident that may be subject to 
criminal proceedings. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is 
often reported that some cases that merit criminal proceedings are being referred 
to the traditional judiciary by village chiefs when it is considered more effective to 
handle them within the community (Interview with Masako Yokoyama of UNDP, 
July 24, 2013). This is the result of the court’s view that settlement by village 
mediation led by a village chief who has a good overview of the details of the case 
is a rational solution. At the same time, it is seen as a way of reducing pressure on 
the formal courts which are experiencing a backlog of undecided cases.
As indicated above, if there is a legal issue that presupposes the implementa-
tion of traditional norms, particularly when access to legal remedies is scarce, 
an analysis of the correlation between formal and traditional legal frameworks 
needs to be made. In addition, there may be situations in some regions where 
the jurisdiction of the criminal law differs from (or overlaps with) that of the 
traditional judiciary if the responsibilities and roles assigned to village chiefs by 
the Law Concerning Community Leaderships and Their Election are applied. It is 
necessary to clearly define the jurisdiction of traditional justice and its correlation 
with state law in order to minimize differences in the interpretation of the law 
and to maintain fairness. 
Considering these points, it would be appropriate for the Ministry of Justice 
to study the traditional governance mechanisms and define them in state law. 
In addition, given that several bills defining customary law are currently under 
discussion, it may be necessary to appoint a competent authority responsible for 
coordinating the state laws or ministerial decrees lodged by different ministries. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, there is a research officer in charge of 
culture and tradition in the President’s Office who is conducting studies on the 
traditional judiciary (Interview with Vital Nelinho, December 30, 2016). These 
studies, however, are being conducted from a cultural point of view, and the office 
does not have the function of ensuring consistency with the relevant state laws.
The Stance of Political Leaders on Traditional Governance Mechanisms 
Meanwhile, Timor-Leste’s political leaders have not pressed hard for legal 
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centralism during parliamentary deliberations on the legal framework but have 
instead accepted the potential roles of the traditional governance mechanisms, 
including the customary laws. Political leaders even appear to be openly tolerant 
of legal pluralism. Particularly in the domestic context, they do not shy away 
from keeping such an approach at the core of the debate on the legal framework, 
as is evident in the above-mentioned statement by Senior Minister Pereira. That 
said, their public positions are more nuanced when they are addressing the 
international community. 
Leaders’ tolerance of legal pluralism is explicit in the political debate 
over constitutional recognition of and protection for their customs, including 
customary laws. Such a position is reflective of community support for traditional 
governance mechanisms, particularly since independence in May 2002. The 
decision of CAVR to use Nahe Biti is a bold example of the national recognition 
of traditional governance mechanisms and the intention of political leaders 
to nurture a sense of ownership over the entire reconciliation process among 
community members.
The “modernization” carried out through the 250 years of Portuguese 
colonization, which was followed after 1975 by Indonesian rule, facilitated a 
departure from customs and resulted in an increase in educational and economic 
opportunities. The country’s traditional governance mechanisms, particularly the 
customary laws, have visibly evolved since independence in 2002.
Having discussed how these traditional governance mechanisms have 
developed in Timor-Leste since the restoration of independence and how their 
formalization is being considered, we will turn, in the following section, to a 
discussion of the challenges and opportunities associated with the application of 
these mechanisms.
 
The Application of Traditional Governance Mechanisms: Challenges and 
Opportunities
Both the ruling and opposition parties have expressed support for traditional 
norms, including customary laws. That position is reinforced by the people’s 
trust in traditional mechanisms and community members’ recognition of their 
effectiveness. That said, during the first years of independence, customary laws 
were often portrayed as remnants of feudal society which could not coexist with 
“modern state laws.” Such a perception was expressed by political leaders in their 
speeches during that period. As Xanana Gusmão, the president at the time of 
independence, stated at the International Conference on Traditional Conflict 
Resolution & Traditional Justice in Dili, Timor-Leste:
Common or traditional laws also represent the stage of evolution of a society and 
usually correspond to societies based on feudal relationships both in the social and 
religious (non-formal religions) aspects; both aspects are combined with the political 
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and economic ones and add to another which refers to castes as the lower echelons of 
society, slaves and those who practice witchcraft and whom [sic] are usually denied 
rights (Gusmão 2005).
Further investigation reveals that this statement was targeted at foreign 
stake holders, particularly development partners; the tone of Gusmão’s speeches 
delivered to the Timorese people was quite different, and they highlight his 
affirmation of customs and traditions, including their rules and norms.  
The Ministry of Justice’s struggle to confer legitimacy on traditional 
governance mechanisms within the legal framework is a work in progress that 
needs to be built upon with a delicate balance between tradition and modern 
liberal values. As noted above, Senior Minister Pereira holds the view that 
traditions and culture, rather than ideologies, were the foundation of Timor-
Leste’s independence. This leads one to believe that political endorsement of 
tradition and culture should not involve a struggle. However, the senior minister 
also articulated thus in his August 2013 interview:
So when we build a state and transform people’s mentality to accept the individual 
as the unit, not the communal family as the unit from the customary law, you have a 
serious challenge here. … But for the state to develop, you need this concept of private 
property. Because that is the concept of justifying the existence of a state. So, once you 
have private property, then you have individualism, and individualistic approach to 
existence and development.
These views explain the need for balance and why the Draft Act has still not 
been finalized after twenty years. It is a constant struggle and an ongoing process 
of transformation, within which the people and communities of Timor-Leste 
must experience the process of modernizing traditional governance mechanisms 
in their own way. 
Conclusions
Conflict-riven Timor-Leste has faced challenges resulting from limited social 
resources during the period of reconstruction. In these circumstances, it is 
a realistic approach to utilize traditional governance mechanisms, such as 
traditional judicial proceedings and traditional norms. Furthermore, if the state 
laws can adopt some of the properties of the traditional restorative justice system, 
the resulting hybrid legal framework might be considered progressive and 
sustainable. This would retain the positive elements of a community approach. 
In other words, rather than using the traditional governance mechanisms 
as a temporary measure in lieu of other legal instruments, traditional knowledge 
and institutions could facilitate the realization of the rule of law, particularly if 
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such mechanisms are regularized. During the twenty years since independence, 
the people of Timor-Leste have built the foundation upon which transformed 
traditional mechanisms can be integrated into state law. In this context, the 
anticipated finalization of the Draft Act will be of great significance. 
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